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VOLUME XLIII JULY 1968 NUMBER 1
PRIMA PAINT v. FLOOD & CONKLIN
-WHAT DOES IT MEAN?
GEmALD AKsEw *
V OLUNTARY arbitration is employed by businessmen
to achieve expedition, expertise and expense-saving in
resolving their commercial disputes. When the arbitration
is permitted to proceed in its own forum, free from un-
due technicalities and properly administered, these three
great advantages over litigation can be gained. Alter-
natively, if a respondent is permitted to plead dilatory
defenses to avoid his promise to arbitrate when, after the
dispute erupts, delay better suits his purpose, all of these
advantages are materially impaired and even destroyed.
To avoid this dilemma and to insure prompt compli-
ance with the promise to arbitrate, modern arbitration laws
provide a convenient and summary procedure to specifically
enforce the arbitration agreement. One such law is the
Federal Arbitration Act,' enacted in 1925, which contains
in section 3 procedures to stay court proceedings brought
in lieu of the arbitration clause, and in section 4 remedial
steps to compel compliance with the arbitration agreement.
The Congressional intent behind the enactment of the
* B.A. 1951, C.C.N.Y.; M.A. 1952, Columbia University; J.D. 1958,
New York University Law School; Counsel, American Arbitration Asso-
ciation.
The opinions expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily
represent the views of the American Arbitration Association.
2Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1964), formerly 43 Stat. 883 (1925),
as amended, 66 Stat. 669 (1947).
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Federal Arbitration Act was ruled upon in 1967 by the
United States Supreme Court in Prima Paint v. Flood &
Conldin Mfg. Ca.,2 which is undoubtedly the most signi-
ficant judicial opinion ever rendered concerning agreements
to arbitrate commercial controversies. For the first time
since the enactment of the Federal law, the businessman
has been assured by the High Court that when he intends
a prompt resolution of his disputes through the arbitral
forum, he is legally entitled to pursue his rights in that
forum without any "delay . . . [or] obstruction in the
courts." '
Prima, Paint v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., holds that
as a matter of federal law, where the parties insert a
broad arbitration clause, an arbitrator rather than a federal
court decides if the principal contract has been fraudu-
lently induced, and this rule, one of national substantive
law, governs even in the face of a contrary state rule.'
The holding is important because it will seriously curtail
attempts to circumvent the broad arbitration clause used
in so many interstate commercial transactions today.
Of greater impact, however, are the many other issues
necessarily ruled upon by the Court. In addition to re-
solving a conflict in the circuit courts of appeals con-
cerning the appropriate approach to this question, the
opinion dealt with such questions as the scope to be ac-
corded the broad arbitration clause, the concept of the
"separate" arbitration agreement, the test of "commerce"
applicable to evidence a transaction under the Act, the
uniform treatment that federal district courts will apply
to motions to compel or stay arbitration whether under
sections 3 or 4 of the Act, the meaning of federal juris-
diction save for the arbitration agreement, the characteri-
2388 U.S. 395 (1967).
3 Id. at 404.
4 Id. at 404-05.
5 Compare Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271 F2d
402 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. granted, 362 U.S. 909, dismissed, 364 U.S. 801
(1960), with Lummus Co. v. Commonwealth Oil Ref. Co., 280 F2d 915,
923-24 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 911 (1960). See also Note, Com-
mercial Arbitration in the Federal Courts, 20 VAi,. L. RPv. 607, 622-25
(1967).
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zation of arbitration as "substantive" rather than pro-
cedural for Erie purposes thus disposing of constitutional
limitations, the effect of seeking "rescissional" relief, the
attempts to define the area of contracts to which the rule
applies, and the difference in result from Robert Lawrence
v. Devon-shire Fabric&, Inc.6--all of which are affected by
this decision.
Indeed, the issues treated directly, as well as the im-
plications on the enforcement of future agreements to ar-
bitrate and the effect of contrary state rules easily presage
Prima Paint as a "landmark" opinion. This article will
discuss and analyze the decision both as to its immediate
impact and its effect on the future development of volun-
tary arbitration law and practice in the commercial com-
munity.
FRED01 TO ARBITRATu FRAUD- A
TRI MPH OF VOLUNTARISMA
The key to the meaning of the brief but straight-
forward opinion of Mr. Justice Fortas rests in the "policy
decision" that parties are free to agree that legal issues
such as fraud may be arbitrated. Indeed, this may be the
primary consideration behind a firm understanding of this
decision which sets forth the national substantive law of
voluntary agreements to arbitrate commercial controversies,
i.e., where parties intend that a third person, other than
a publically constituted court, should decide whether fraud
has been practiced, they may so provide.
Let us look briefly at the facts of this case for an
example of how this policy applies. The business trans-
action involved here concerned two parties both of whom
were in the business of manufacturing and selling paint.
Sometime in September of 1964, Prima Paint purchased
F&O's paint business. Later, in October of 1964, an agree-
ment was entered into between them whereby F&C for a
six year period was to furnish advice and consultation in
6 271 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1959).
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connection with the formulae, manufacturing operation,
sales and services of Prima Paint's trade sale accounts.
Further, F&C promised to make no trade sales of paint
in the existing sales territory or to any of its current
customers. F&C also appended to the agreement lists of
its customers whose patronage was taken over by Prima
Paint. For its part, Prima agreed to pay certain per-
centages of all its receipts, such payments not to exceed
a maximum amount of $225,000 over the life of the agree-
ment. Approximately one year later, on October 1, 1965,
the first payment under the consulting agreement was due
from Prima to F&O. Rather than make payment, Prima
first notified the attorneys for F&C that in various respects
F&C had breached the consulting agreement and then made
the first payment to an escrowee under protest. The prin-
cipal allegation was that F&C had fraudulently represented
that it was solvent, whereas, in fact, it was insolvent
and had intended to file a voluntary petition in bank-
ruptcy shortly after the execution of the consulting agree-
ment.7 Prima's contention was that had it known of this
fact of insolvency, it would never have entered into this
transaction at all. That is, were it not for this fraudulent
misrepresentation, it would not have consummated "the
business deal."
At this juncture, let us assume for a moment that the
consulting agreement did not contain any provision for
arbitration. There is little doubt, that absent an arbitra-
tion clause, if the parties had desired, they could have
submitted this pending dispute over fraudulent inducement
to an arbitrator and his final and binding determination
would have been as effective as any voluntary settlement
between disputants.
Instead, there already was an arbitration clause in
the consulting agreement which recited "any controversy
or claim arising out of or relating to this agreement shall
be settled by arbitration." Ignoring the arbitration clause,
7 One week after the consulting agreement was entered into, F&C filed
a voluntary petition in the U.S. District Court for the District of New
Jersey under the provisions of Chapter XI of the Bankruptcy Act.
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Prima Paint brought an action to rescind the entire con-
sulting agreement on the ground of fraud.' F&C moved
to stay Prima Paint's lawsuit for rescission pending ar-
bitration of the fraud issue raised by Prima. The district
court 9 and the Second Circuit Court of Appeals' 0 granted
the stay of the lawsuit holding as a matter of national
substantive law that an arbitration clause contained in a
contract evidencing a transaction in commerce is separate
from the rest of the contract and, therefore, allegations
which go to the validity of the principal contract as opposed
to the arbitration clause itself are properly matters to
be decided by the arbitrator rather than the court.
In affirming, Prima, holds that parties are permitted
to agree in advance of a dispute over misrepresentation
that this issue may be submitted to arbitration. Nor is
this permission lightly granted. What is required is con-
tractual language which clearly shows an intent to arbi-
trate rather than litigate what is otherwise a "legal issue,"
namely fraud. Honoring this voluntary agreement to ar-
bitrate future questions of fraud is no more than uphold-
ing the principle of freedom of contract.
Once it is conceded that parties may provide by con-
tract to arbitrate fraud in the inducement disputes, the
question of appropriate contractual intent arises. This
requires an examination of the arbitration clause.
T m ARBITRATION CLAUSE
The contractual language by which the parties mani-
fested their intent to have issues of fraud arbitrated read:
Any controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this agree-
ment, or the breach thereof, shall be settled by arbitration in the
City of New York in accordance with the rules then obtaining of
the American Arbitration Association. .... 11
8 The complaint neither sought nor alleged any damages, but asked only
for a judgment that the agreement be rescinded.
" Memorandum opinion Croake, J. in the United States District Court
of the Southern District of New York, February 10, 1966 (unreported).
10 Prima Paint v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 360 F.2d 315 (2d Cir.
1966).
18388 U.S. 395, 398 (1967).
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The Court characterized this arbitration agreement as
one which was "easily broad enough" "2 to encompass dis-
putes allegedly procured by fraud.
This wording is the "Standard Arbitration Clause""3
recommended by the AAA for insertion in all commercial
contracts and was specifically designed for use by parties
desiring maximum assurance that any later-arising dis-
pute be adjudicated in the arbitral forum.
Acknowledging the intent accorded this all-embracing
arbitration clause was merely a reaffirmation of every prior
court decision in this field of arbitration law. Indeed,
several courts have even used this clause as establishing
clear guidelines for attorneys to use in framing appropriate
language which would avoid disputes over its meaning.
For instance, in In re Kino&hita - Co.,' 4 it was noted in
passing upon another arbitration agreement:
Had the parties used the standard clause recommended by the
American Arbitration Association and widely used, the arbitration
agreement would clearly have been sufficiently broad to cover a
dispute over fraudulent inducement. .... 15
In addition to the Kinoshita case previously cited,
another recent illustration was a clause found in a con-
struction contract which limited arbitration to "any ques-
tion of fact." 16 Once again, the court made special refer-
ence to the fact that the parties had not utilized the broad
language suggested by the AAA, and therefore intended
to limit the issues that the arbitrator could properly decide.
The Court's ruling concerning the interpretation. ac-
corded the "broad arbitration clause" will undoubtedly ease
the task of counsel in drafting future commercial contracts.
Utilization of the standard language will eliminate any
doubt over what is to be arbitrated. All disagreements, of
12Id.'at 406.
is See F. KLLOR, AMERqAN ARBITRATIoN 231 (1948).'
14287 F.2d 951 (2d Cir. 1961).
l5 Id. at 953.
16 J.p. Greathouse Steel Erectors, Inc. v. Blount Bros, Constr. Co., 374
F.2d 324 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
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any nature whatsoever, whether based on tortious conduct
or contractual breaches, shall be heard by the arbitrator.
Henceforth, parties desiring to exclude certain ques-
tions from arbitration will not use the broad clause. Where
it is the intent of businessmen to exclude from the arbitral
forum "legal issues" relating to the contract, they may so
provide in their arbitration clause.
SEPARABILITY
The essential point that makes this broad jurisdiction
of the arbitrator possible is the ruling that the arbitration
clause is separable.'7
Prima was a Maryland corporation, F&C a New Jersey
company, and the agreement provided for arbitration in
New York. The state law of all three of these states1"
enforced valid agreements to arbitrate future disputes so
that it was immaterial whether Section 2 of the Federal
Act or the appropriate state law applied. The result would
have been the same.
The issue in Prima was therefore not directly con-
cerned with enforceability, but rather with "whether the
arbitration clause in a contract induced by fraud is
'separable'." 29
As a matter of national substantive law, it is now
abundantly clear that an arbitration clause providing that
"any controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this
agreement, or the breach thereof . . ." is "separable" from
the rest of the contract so that allegations toward the
validity of the main contract as opposed to the arbitration
agreement are to be decided by the arbitrator.
Once again, the "policy" ruling that the promise to
arbitrate may be considered separately from the principal
17 For a treatment of this subject, see Nussbaum, The "Separability
Doctrine" in American and Foreign Arbitration, 17 N.Y.U.L.Q. REv. 609
(1940).
Is See, e.g., N.Y. Crv. PRAc. §-7501; N.J. REv. STAT. § 2A: 24-1 (1951);
MD. ANN. CODE art. 7, § 1 (1957).
2ORealistically, however, there is very little difference because one would
not reach the question of separability unless the arbitration agreement was
enforceable.
1968 ]
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contract in which it is "embedded" becomes paramount.
For if the Court had decided otherwise, an allegation that
the entire transaction was fraudulently induced would have
meant that the arbitration provision necessarily falls with
the rest of the contract. A prime illustration exists in
this case where Prima sought rescission of the whole trans-
action. If it merely would have commenced an action for
damages based on the alleged fraud, this would have had
the effect of affirming the principal contract, including the
arbitration clause, if the latter was considered inseparable.
Conversely, where the arbitration clause is viewed as
separable, the objection is avoided, since no taint attaches
to the arbitrator's contractual power under the arbitration
clause, unless that clause itself is alleged to be fraudulently
induced.
Proof that the arbitration agreement is separable from
the principal agreement is drawn from Section 4 of the
Federal Arbitration Act.2" Under this section, so long
as a matter is properly before the jurisdiction of the fed-
eral court, the federal court must order arbitration to
proceed if it is "satisfied that the making of the agreement
for arbitration is not in issue." This language provides
a remedy obtainable in federal courts when a party is
aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect or refusal of
another to arbitrate under a written agreement of arbitra-
tion. Further, the federal court is limited at the hearing
to a determination of whether an agreement for arbitration
has been made and has not been honored. Once satisfied
on these two points, it has no choice but to order arbitra-
tion to proceed.
20 Section 4 reads in part:
The court shall hear the parties, and upon being satisfied that the
making of the agreement for arbitration or the failure to comply
therewith is not in issue, the court shall make an order directing the
parties to proceed to arbitration in accordance with the terms of
the agreement. . . . If the making of the arbitration agreement,
or the failure, neglect, or refusal to perform the same be in issue,
the court shall proceed summarily to the trial thereof. . . , 9 U.S.C.
§ 4 (1964),
[ VoL. 43
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EFTEcT ON STATE ARBITRATION LAWS
It is perhaps significant to note that neither New
Jersey nor Maryland nor any other state with a modern
arbitration law-with the possible exception of New York
-has formulated a rule of "non-separability."
In the final analysis, for those states which have not
enacted modern legislation enforcing future dispute arbi-
tration clauses, the issue of the separate arbitration clause
is not likely to arise; for if the promise to arbitrate is
itself not specifically enforceable, it is difficult to imagine
how the question of separability would even be reached un-
der state law. In the twenty-three jurisdictions 2 that have
enacted such legislation the state courts can take comfort in
the fact that there is no strong public policy against an ar-
bitrator being permitted to decide issues of fraudulent in-
ducement of the contract. No state anywhere in the United
States has a statute codifying a rule of non-separability.
(There is no state statute to the contrary). Indeed, the
state courts now have the benefit of clear precedent by the
highest judicial tribunal establishing a separability rule.
This ruling will undoubtedly carry persuasive weight that
may be followed when and if state judges are called upon
to interpret their own local arbitration laws.
The present state of the law in New York is, admit-
tedly, uncertain. The confusion stems from an "assump-
tion" on the part of jurists that arbitration clauses in New
York are not separable from the contracts in which they
are contained. Nevertheless, the issue has not been square-
ly faced by the New York Court of Appeals.2" It is sub-
mitted that the Prima, Paint decision paves the way for a
"fresh look" at the New York law and a possible re-evalua-
tion of its past policy which, conscious or otherwise,
21 There are 23 states with such statutes. They are: Arizona, California,
Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massa-
chusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York,
Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Texas, Washington, Wisconsin,
Wyoming.
22 See Collins, Arbitration and the Uniform Commercial Code, 41
N.Y.U.L. RV. 736, 747 (1966).
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avoided fashioning a separability rule. Indeed, Exercyjcle
v. Maratt,23 the very case which contained dictum to the
effect that arbitration would not lie where the plaintiff
seeks rescission for fraud, can itself be cited for the prop-
osition that arbitration clauses are separable in New York.
For in Exercyle, the Court ordered arbitration although
the complainant alleged the main contract was void for
lack of mutuality. It is difficult in logic to explain how
an arbitrator can void such an agreement unless, in fact,
his authority stems from a "separate" contract."
It would also be a strange result if New York followed
a non-separability rule based on the language of its arbitra-
tion act, since it Was in fact the same law which was later
enacted by Congress and presently embodied in the United
States Arbitration Act.2 5  Since the federal act follows
the pattern of the New York law and incorporates the
language of the same draftsmen, the meaning of the same
terms now ruled upon by the Supreme Court should be of
significance to the New York courts.2"
Even if it be assumed that the judicial interpretation
of New York law is that arbitration clauses are not sepa-
rable, this rule may be easily overturned even though tech-
nically not "pre-empted" where interstate commerce is
evidenced.
NATURE OF RII' SOUGHT -RsoISSION
Another primary consequence of the separability view
is that it once and for all disposes of the rescission or
"red herring" argument Which couches itself in the nature
of the relief sought. Some commentators and jurists had
239 N.Y.2d 329, 174 N.E.2d 463, 214 N.Y.S.2d 353 (1961).
24See Bernstein, The Impact of the Uniform Commercial Code Upon
Arbitration, 42 N.Y.U.L. Ray. 8, 19 (1967).
25 See Note, Erie, Bernhardt, and Section 2 of the United States Arbitra-
tion Act: A Farrago, of Rights, Remedies, and a Right to a Remedy,
69 YALE LJ. 847, 854 (1960).2 6 Although New York amended, its Arbitration Statute (CPLR 7501)
so that it no longer contains the words "valid, enforceable and irrevocable,"
no difference in result was intended br the New York legislature. See
8 WmNsTmN, KoaN & MILLER, Nav YoRx CIVIL PRAcncE 7501.03 (1967).
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previously attempted to establish artificial guidelines as to
when a court or an arbitrator could decide fraud. Court
decisions in Neew York 27 may be found which hold that
fraudulent inducement is arbitrable where the plaintiff seeks
damages but is a question for the court if rescissional relief
is sought. Such a distinction is artificial and in any event
denies any weight to the parties' contractual intent. This
view undoubtedly resulted from the unexplained determina-
tion that arbitration clauses were not separable from the
principal contracts. As rescission was the relief requested
by Prima, the Court's result proves that under the separable
arbitration agreement view, the rescission argument
amounts to nought.
THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION AcT
The first four sections of the Federal Arbitration Act
were given careful scrutiny by the Court. In so doing, the
opinion renders valuable insight into a clear understanding
of the appropriate scope to be accorded the Federal Arbi-
tration Act. First, it points out that section 1 is meant
both to define the areas of "maritime" transactions and
"commerce" and to limit the applicable contracts to which
the act applies."
Perhaps it is too obvious to mention, but the primary
requirement calls for the principal contract, not the arbi-
tration agreement, to evidence a transaction involving inter-
state commerce. This test was clearly enunciated by the
,Court when it recited that "[o]ur first question . . . is
whether the consulting agreement between F&C and Prima
Paint" evidences a transaction in interstate commerce.29
The main contract was then analyzed in reaching the con-
clusion on commerce. Once having determined that the
principal contract in question was within the coverage of
27 An excellent survey will be found in 42 WASH. L. REV. 621, 626-29
(1967).
28388 U.S. 395, 400 n.4 (1967).
29 Id. at 401 (emphasis added).
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the Arbitration Act, the Court then analyzed the language
of the arbitration agreement.
This is perhaps a unique situation in that the contract
used to meet the "commerce requirement" test is the same
agreement which the Court is not permitted to interpret.
For, if the principal contract does reflect al interstate com-
merce element, then under the broad-type separate arbitra-
tion clause, the arbitrator rather than the federal court
will determine the principal agreement's validity.
At this juncture, it might be wise to determine what
contracts are governed by the Federal Arbitration Act of
1925, for it is only contracts within the scope of this law
that the Court addresses itself to in Prima. Certain cate-
gories of contracts, namely those "in which one of the
parties characteristically has little bargaining power"30
are expressly excluded, said the Court, from the reach of
the Act. This latter point while mentioned only in passing
in a footnote will probably become as famous as another
Supreme Court footnote where it was held that arbitrability
is for the courts." For here we have an inlding of the
Court's feeling on arbitration. On the one hand, the hold-
ing in Prima Paint sets a general policy rule that federal
courts will give effect to the intention of the parties to a
contract that all their disputes shall be settled by arbitra-
tion. But, in so doing, the Court reflects the view that
the contract involved should be one in which "arms length
negotiations" have preceded the promise to arbitrate. In
other words, where parties are of equal bargaining power,
giving an arbitrator the power to rescind because of
fraud is not objectionable. In this case Prima and F&C,
both represented by counsel, freely and voluntarily nego-
tiated the terms of the consulting agreement and the arbi-
tration clause.
Whether or not the holding in Prima will be applied to
form contracts or other agreements where there is usually
301d. at 402-03 n.9.
3 United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co.,
363 U.S. 574, 583 rL7 (1960).
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a disparity in economic power is not clear. For instance,
insurance policies, employment contracts, construction
agreements and shipping forms have been recognized as
routinely containing arbitration clauses without any choice
available to one party.2 Under these transactions, it is
difficult to say that the promise to arbitrate was the result
of equality in negotiations. Future judicial interpretation
will be needed before a definitive list of the types of con-
tracts which the Federal Act excludes in section 1 can be
compiled.33 Even so, it is doubtful in today's economic
and social climate, coupled with the urban calendar conges-
tion plaguing trial and appellate courts, whether significant
value can be placed upon the "take-it-or-leave-it contract"
theory. Indeed, it could be argued today that the "poor
employees" or the unsuspecting policyholder of an insur-
ance contract might prefer this faster mode of arbitration
were he given his choice. "Overprotection" based on legal
technicality may prove to his detriment.
Next, the Court interpreted the meaning of the "heart"
of the modern Federal Arbitration Act- section 2 which
provides that "[a] written provision in . . . a contract
involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy
thereafter arising out of such contract . . . shall be valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as
exists at law or in equity for this revocation of any con-
tract." 3
It is this section of the law which in fact overrules the
common-law hostility toward arbitration so as to avail the
benefits of arbitration to the business community. While
arbitration agreements historically were "valid" in the sense
that parties could agree to arbitrate, they were revocable
32 Hearing on §4213 and §4214 before a Subcommittee of the Committee
on the Judiciary of the United States Senate, 67th Cong., 4th Sess., at 9-11.
Senator Walsh: "The trouble about the matter is that a great many of
these contracts that are entered into are not voluntary things at all. Take
an insurance policy. . . . You can take it or leave it. . . ." Mr. Piatt:
"[B]ut it is not the intention of this bill to cover that kind of case."
Id. at 9.
3 There are many different types of contracts for which arbitration is
used. See M. DomKE, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION ch. 13 (1960).
349 U.S.C. §2 (1964).
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at the will of either party prior to the award and com-
pletely unenforceable.
In other words, prior to the enactment of section 2,
contracts to arbitrate were treated in a discriminatory
fashion. Any other contractual promise was enforceable
at law or in equity but not an arbitration contract. Sec-
tion 2 merely carries out the Congressional intent to remove
arbitration contracts from second class status and to place
them in a "separate but equal" ground with all other con-
tracts. As a matter of national substantive law, arbitration
agreements were made, by section 2, as enforceable "as
other contracts, but not more so." "
To insure that arbitration clauses are placed upon the
same footing as other contracts, Congress specifically placed
the "saving clause" 6 in section 2 so that if the contract
to arbitrate is itself invalid or revocable then the federal
courts have the authority to invalidate it just as they could
any other contract, in which there were grounds "at law
or-in equity" to be revoked.
Prima, makes clear that if fraud is alleged toward the
arbitration clause, then the federal court shall preliminarily
proceed to a trial on this issue. There is no doubt that
section 2 assumes. the existence of a valid contract to
arbitrate. Together with sections 3 and 4 Congress has
furnished safeguards so that a person fraudulently induced
to sign an arbitration clause is guaranteed the right to sub-
mit this legal issue to the federal court for determination.
Nor is it difficult to envision what kinds of issues
raised by allegations of fraudulent inducement of an arbi-
tration clause a court will decide under the Prima, holding.
All the complaint need allege is fraud relating to the arbi-
tration provision rather than to the principal agreement.
An example of such an allegation was given in the prior
Supreme Court decision of Moseley 'v. Electronic 4. Missile
Facilities." Here, it was alleged' that the aggrieved party,
35 Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404
n.12 (1967).
36 Id.
37374 U.S. 167 (1963).
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to the arbitration agreement was deliberately defrauded
into arbitrating in another state so that the wrongdoer
could make unreasonable demands in the hope that the
extra expense and inconvenience of having to travel from
Georgia to New York would induce yielding to such de.
mands. The Court held that such an allegation charged
fraud as to the arbitration clause itself and remanded to
the district court for a determination of that issue before
arbitration could be compelled under section 3.
The Court in Prima then proceeded to give its explana-
tion of sections 3 and 4: of the Federal Act:
Section 3 requires a federal court in which suit has been brought
"upon any issue referable to arbitration under an agreement in
writing for such arbitration" to stay the court action pending arbi-
tration once it is satisfied that the issue is arbitrable under the
agreement. Section 4 provides a federal remedy for a party
"aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or refusal of another to
arbitrate under a written agreement of arbitration," and directs the
federal court to order arbitration once it is satisfied that an agree-
ment for arbitration has been made and has not been honored.38
Under the facts of this case, F&C brought on the arbi-
tration not by a section 4 petition to compel arbitration,
but rather by merely serving a Demand for Arbitration 89
under the Commercial Arbitration Rules of the AAA.
Thereafter, Prima instituted an action in the federal district
court seeking a judgment that the consulting agreement be
rescinded. Contemporaneously with the institution of the
action, Prima sought to enjoin F&G from proceeding with
the arbitration filed with AAA.
The manner in which the parties proceeded is interest-
ing if for no other reason than that neither of them avail-
ed himself of the applicable section 4 remedies offered by
the statute. (There is no procedure under the Act by which
38388 U.S. 395, 400 (1967).
39According to §7(a) of the Commercial Arbitration Rules of the
American Arbitration Association, arbitration under an arbitration provision
in a contract may be initiated in the following manner: "The initiating
party may give notice to the other party of his intention to arbitrate
(Demand), which notice shall contain a statement setting forth the nature of
the dispute, the amount involved, if any, [and] the remedy sought. .. "
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to enjoin arbitration-the remedy pursued by Prima; it
was not until Prima moved to enjoin arbitration that F&C
cross-moved for an order to stay the federal rescission
action instituted by Prima-presumably under section 3.)
This order of proceedings is of further significance
because it helps one to understand. the Court's explanation
of how federal district courts are to deal with future appli-
cations to compel arbitration, stay arbitration or stay a
court proceeding pending arbitration. Most obvious is the
fact that the federal law recognizes two methods of com-
mencing arbitration, either by filing a notice of intention
to arbitrate or by a section I motion to compel arbitration.
It follows that since a party to an interstate contract
may initiate arbitration without a court order, a pro-
cedure should be available to stay that arbitration where
valid grounds exist.40 This procedure although not spe-
cifically stated in either sections 3 or 4 of the Act was
exactly the course pursued by Prima when it sought to
enjoin arbitration.
Likewise, the Court recognizes that a party may com-
mence a litigation in violation of the promise to arbitrate,
and realizes that section 3 permits the district court to
stay the trial of that action until arbitration has been had
in accordance with the terms of the arbitration agreement.
Where a party commences arbitration under section 4,
(which did not occur here) the court, "upon being satisfied
that the making of the agreement for arbitration or the
failure to comply therewith is not in issue, must make an
order directing the parties to arbitrate." "' Section 4 allows
no choice to the federal district judge. He has now been
instructed to order arbitration to proceed. This mandatory
direction to the federal courts is found only in section 4.
The question then arises as to whether the district court is
so compelled to order arbitration under a section 3 request
40 The Federal Arbitration Act has no specific section containing a motion
to stay arbitration. The New York Arbitration Statute has CPLR § 7503(b)
entitled "Application to stay arbitration."
419 U.S.C. § 4 (1964) (emphasis added).
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to stay a pending lawsuit. In the clearest possible lan-
guage Prima states:
Section 4 does not expressly relate to situations like the present in
which a stay is sought of a federal action in order that arbitration
may proceed. But it is inconceivable that Congress intended the
rule to differ depending upon which party to the arbitration agree-
ment first invokes the assistance of a federal court. We hold,
therefore, that in passing upon a § 3 application for a stay while
the parties arbitrate, a federal court may consider only issues
relating to the making and performance of the agreement to
arbitrate.4 2
The Prima decision would thus appear to be dispositive
of any questions as to the Arbitration Act's application to
interstate transactions, just as Bernhardt vt. Polygraphic
Co. of America43  disposed of intrastate dealings. Not
only do section 3 applications fall within the kind of con-
tracts specified by sections 1 and 2 of the Act, but also
section 4 applications are similarly treated.
Although not discussed in the case, there is little doubt
that federal law will also have to be fashioned upon other
sections of the Act. For instance, section 5 provides a
procedure for the district court to appoint arbitrators where
the parties are unable to agree. In at least one state with
a modern arbitration law, namely Illinois," the rule is
to the contrary. In this state, if the parties fail to agree
on arbitrators, "the entire arbitration agreement shall ter-
minate." Only future judicial clarification will tell whether
section 5 is of sufficient substance to prevail over a "con-
trary state rule." The choice once again will be to enforce
42388 U.S. 395, 404 (1967).
43 350 U.S. 198 (1956).44 1L. ANN. STAT. ch. 10, § 103 (1966) (Uniform Arbitration Act):
If the arbitration agreement provides a method of appointment of
arbitrators, this method shall be followed. In the absence thereof,
any method of appointment of arbitrators agreed upon by the parties
to the contract shall be followed. An arbitrator so appointed has all
the powers of one specificially named in the agreement. When an
arbitrator appointed fails or is unable to act, his successor shall be
appointed in the same manner as the original appointment. If the
method of appointment of arbitrators is not specified in the agreement
and cannot be agreed upon by the parties, the entire arbitration agree-
ment shall terminate.
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arbitration by relying on federal law or to deny arbitration
because of the conflicting state law.
Likewise, there are other important sections of the
Federal Act which seem "procedural" at first glance, but
will upon reflection require fashioning of federal policy.
Sections 9, 10 and 11, for example, provide specified grounds
for confirming, vacating or modifying awards. While most
state laws are similar, there are some differences and sev-
eral states have additional or other grounds. 5 Here again,
the appropriate law to be applied may conceivably affect
the result.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEIMS
The first realization of constitutional problems caused
by the Federal Arbitration Act came to light in Bernhardt
v. Polygraphic Co. of America46  where the Supreme
Court avoided the need of resolving any constitutional
problems by holding the Act inapplicable to a diversity of
citizenship case involving only an intrastate contract. In
this case, however, the Court decided that enforcement of
arbitration agreements is "outcome determinative" for Erie
purposes and, therefore, the federal courts would be bound
to follow state law. The stage was thus set for the drama
that unfolded when F&C entered into its consulting agree-
ment with Prima. For as already noted, unless the arbi-
tration agreement was viewed as separable, Prima would
have had a trial on the issue of fraud in the inducement.
Briefly, the issue was whether the Federal Arbitration Act
promulgated 13 years prior to Erie v. Tompkins could be
constitutionally applied in a diversity case even though
45 Pennsylvania, for example, provides, in addition to the standard grounds
for modification of awards that "[fln either of the following cases the
court shall make an order modifying or correcting the award upon the
application of any party to the arbitration . . . (d) where the award is
against the law, and is such that had it been a verdict of the jury the
court would have entered different or other judgment notwithstanding the
verdict" PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 171 (1963).
650 U.S. 198, 202, 208 (1956). "Erie v. Tompkins indicated that
Congress does not have the constitutional authority to make the law that
is applicable to controversies in diversity of citizenship cases." Id. at 202.
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such an interpretation might mean that the federal court
result would be different from that of a state court "across
the street." By characterizing the United States Arbitra-
tion Act as being "based upon and confined to the incon-
testable federal foundation of control over interstate com-
merce and over admiralty" the Supreme Court has avoided
the "constitutional problem" left open by the Bernhardt
decision. The confusion oft-discussed by commentators
47
and court decisions48 has finally been resolved. There
should no longer be any doubt that Congress prescribed
federal substantive law governing an arbitration agreement
where this separate provision to arbitrate is embedded in a
contract which itself evidences a transaction in commerce.
This rule comes about not because Congress was trying to
promulgate substantive rules for diversity situations, but
rather because Congress was prescribing "how federal
courts are to conduct themselves with respect to subject
matter over which Congress plainly has power to legis-
late." " Thus in one brief passage the constitutional dilem-
ma has been dispelled.
DIFFERENcEs BETWBEN LAWR NCE AND PMn1A
It should not come as a surprise that the Act itself
was founded upon Congress' constitutional power to enact
legislation creating substantive law for interstate commerce
and maritime transactions. The second circuit in Law-
fence v. Devonshire Fabrics " had similarly resolved the
constitutional argument propounded by Erie and Bernhardt
some five years before F&C and Prima ever thought of sign-
ing their deal. What may be of import, however, is the
acknowledged statement by Justice Fortas that the result
47 See Note, Erie, Bernhardt, and Section 2 of the United States Arbi-
tration, Act: A Farrago of Rights, Remedies and a Right to a Remedy,
69 YALE L.J. 847 (1960); Note, Commercial Arbitration in the Federal
Courts, 20 VAND. L. REv. 607 (1967).
48 See Metro Indus. Painting Corp. v. Terminal Constr. Co., 287 F.2d
382 (2d Cir. 1961); Lummus Co. v. Commonwealth Oil Ref. Co., 280 F.2d
915 (lst Cir. 1960).
4 388 U.S. 395, 405 (1967) (emphasis added).
ro271 F..d 402 (2d Cir. 1959).
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in Prima although the same as in Lawrence was con-
cluded "for somewhat different reasons." 1 Let us compare
the results and the "reasons," and attempt to analyze what
possible differences there are and what effect, if any, they
will have on future arbitration law.
To begin with, both decisions disposed of the constitu-
tional issue by finding the Federal Act based on Congress'
power to enact substantive law governing interstate com-
merce. Judge Medina reinforced this finding for three basic
reasons: 1) "Because the exclusion of diversity cases would
emasculate the federal arbitration act," 11 2) he found a
"reasonably clear legislative intent to create a new body
of federal substantive law . . ." " and 3) doubts as to the
construction of the Act ought to be reached in line with its
liberal policy of promoting arbitration. 4 Thus, the ration-
alization in Lawrence was primarily based on "policy" type
reasoning rather than specific language. Not so with Jus-
tice Fortas' opinion. Instead, Prima, employs definite state-
ments in finding the congressional purpose and constitu-
tional base-"[i]t is clear beyond dispute that the federal
arbitration statute is based upon and confined to the incon-
testable federal foundations of control over interstate com-
merce and over admiralty." " Policy decisions cannot be
gleaned from this language. It is directly relegating to a
back seat that rule of Erie in favor of the commerce clause.
Secondly, in La'wrence the second circuit buttressed
the separable arbitration clause argument on section 2 of
the Act, the section which makes arbitration agreements
"valid, irrevocable and enforceable." It stated that "§ 2
does not purport to affect the contract as a whole" 16 and
relied in addition upon "other pertinent considerations
[such as the fact that] [h]istorically arbitration clauses
51 The court actually said "We agree [with the Robert Lawrence opinion]
albeit for somewhat different reasons. . . ." 388 U.S. 395, 400 (1967).
52271 F.2d at 404 (emphasis added).
53 Id. at 406 (emphasis added).
54 Id. at 410.
55 388 U.S. at 405.
56 271 F.2d at 409-10.
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were treated as separable parts of the contract." " In
Prima., the Supreme Court found that Congress provided
an "explicit answer" 11 on separability from section 4 of the
Act. However, on this point it needed the assistance of
implied language 9 and the reminder of the congressional
purpose behind voluntary arbitration."
Third, Judge Medina gave sweeping effect to the scope
of the Act by talking more in terms of its overall scheme.
He constantly referred to the Act as creating national sub-
stantive law."' Not so with Justice Fortas. It seems ap-
parent that the latter's words were chosen with extreme
care. For instance, it is not by chance that he talks of a
"rule" of separability being a matter of national substantive
law which "governs even in the face of a contrary state
rule" and that this "rule" is constitutionally permissible
and that federal courts are bound to follow "rules" enacted
by Congress. It is almost as if the Supreme Court was
"straining" to arrive at the Lawrence result in a manner
calculated to "out do" and "tighten up" the judicial legis-
lative reasoning 2 employed by the second circuit.
In any event, so far as permitting an arbitrator to
decide fraud by finding that Congress made arbitration
agreements separable, there is no significant difference in
the result. The fact that the reasoning is "somewhat dif-
ferent" certainly is of no importance to either F&C or
Prima or the legal practitioners who have to worry about
drafting future arbitration agreements.
57 Id. at 410.
58 388 U.S. at 403.
GO Id.
60 Id. at 404.
61271 F.2d at 404.
62 Justice Fortas' opinion is unique in that he relies heavily on the statu-
tory provisions of the Federal Arbitration Act as establishing control over
the arbitration procedure in the federal courts in order to justify the
separability doctrine. In Lawrence, judge Medina begins by establishing
that the Arbitration Act was designated as a substantive national law
governing even in the face of a contrary state rule.
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MUST STATE COURTS FOLLOW THE FEDERAL RULE?
Why then did the Court attempt to distinguish its
reasons from those advanced by Judge Medina? Was the
concurring opinion by Mr. Justice Harlan merely design-
ed to express a feeling that the policy reasons advanced
by Judge Medina were sufficient to arrive at the result
that the Act created national substantive law? Of course
this is a possibility. It is -conceivable, however, that
the Prima opinion took a narrower tack for another "rea-
son." It is unlikely that the Supreme Court would trouble
itself with new language for vain reasons. Its purpose
probably was to more clearly enunciate the national sub-
stantive law. La'wence stated that the body of federal law
fashioned by federal courts under the Arbitration Act "is
equally applicable in state or federal courts." 11 But Prima
does not hold that the national substantive law of separa-
bility is required to be applied by state courts where the
requisite federal court jurisdiction is lacking.
While it is true that this issue was not essential for
the Court to decide the case before it,64 and, therefore, may
still be an open question, the language employed by Prima,
permits one to conjecture that the Supreme Court inten-
tionally remained silent on this issue of "preemption" over
state courts.
Thus, the Prima opinion goes to great pains to empha-
size that national law on separability is mandatory for
federal courts to follow. The decision is replete with such
references: "the case presents a question of whether a
federal court resolves claims of fraud"; "§ 3 motions re-
quire federal courts to stay court actions"; "§ 4 directs a
federal court to order arbitration"; "with respect 'to cases
in federal courts Congress has provided explicit answers";
"matters in federal courts save for the existence of the arbi-
tration clause"; "the federal court is instructed as to what
to do"; "statutory language does not permit federal courts
03 271 F.2d at 407.
64 Coulson, "Prinuz Paint: An Arbitration Milestone" 23 Bus. LAW.
241, 246 (1967).
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to consider claims of fraud as to the contract generally";
"the case is in federal court solely by reason of diversity";
"Congress may prescribe how federal courts are to conduct
themselves with respect to subject matter"; "federal courts
are bound to apply rules enacted by Congress." This con-
stant reiteration of "federal courts" must have been
used to acknowledge the fact that "over and over again"
the drafters of the Federal Act referred to the establishment
of a procedure in the federal courts. By this language, it
is possible that the Court is saying that the intent of Con-
gress was to only have federal courts enforce separable
arbitration agreements whenever the main contract involves
interstate commerce. This would explain the constant ref-
erence to "federal courts" in the opinion while most appro-
priately following the actual legislative intent of Congress
in 1925.
However, the Court's failure to hold that state courts
must apply a rule of separability where the principal con-
tract evidences a transaction in commerce does not neces-
sarily mean that state courts will fashion a contrary rule.
To begin with, it is likely that most state courts will be
inclined to follow the federal rule voluntarily because to
do otherwise might give rise to "forum shopping"-a prac-
tice that state courts have no desire to encourage. If this
latter conflict arises, surely a state court is capable of
weighing the interests of its citizens against the counter-
vailing considerations of uniformity of results in interstate
commerce. 6' Further, there is no compelling reason for a
state court to avoid using the separability rule whether the
transaction involves intrastate or interstate commerce.
65 For a discussion of policy considerations as to why the preemption
doctrine need not apply, see, for example, Note, Commercial Arbitration
in the Federal Courts, 20 VAND. L. Rv. 607 (1967); Note, Scope of the
United States Arbitration Act it Commercial Arbitration: Problems in
Federalism, 58 Nw. U.L. REv. 468 (1963).
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CONCLUSION
Concluding that the Federal Arbitration Act created
national substantive law upholds the Congressional purpose
of enforcing arbitration agreements so commonplace among
commercial transactions in interstate commerce and ad-
miralty. The concept of a "separate" arbitration clause
enables businessmen to have all their controversies deter-
mined by commercial experts where a clear intent is so
expressed.
Congress recognized years ago that parties are entitled
to agree, should they so desire, that an arbitrator may
decide whether one of the parties was induced by fraud to
enter into the overall business deal. The Supreme Court
has merely affirmed that the judicial hostility toward arbi-
tration eliminated by Congress is truly an anachronism of
the past and shall remain relegated to history. Although
it is not certain whether state courts will apply similar
rules to arbitration agreements where no federal court
jurisdiction is possible, the Prima, case makes it uniquely
difficult for a state court to construe it any other way.
As untold numbers of transactions involve interstate
commerce, business firms will be able to provide for arbi-
tration without fear of dilatory tactics to frustrate reach-
ing the arbitrator promptly.6" This decision is undoubtedly
going to further the independent forum of arbitration of
commercial disputes much the same way that labor disputes
have been freed from litigation. Although it has been a
long time in coming and despite several attempts to thwart
this result, arbitration promises, by federal law, are placed
on an equal footing with all other contractual promises.
The voluntary choice of providing for this method of dis-
pute settlement now rests with the business community.
66 See Comment, Circumventing the Arbitration Clause, N.Y.L.J., March
26, 1968, at 1.
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